Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 19
Cover Image
Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives
Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2024
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014552994
Cover Image
Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives
Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2024
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014493793
Cover Image
Multitasking and the benefits of objective performance measurement : evidence from a field experiment ; conference paper
Manthei, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk - 2013 - Preliminary version
We examine the benefits of objective performance measurement in a field experiment conducted in a retail bank. At the … outset objective performance measures of pro fits in each branch were only available on the branch level and managers … to individual performance measures. We find a significant positive impact of objective performance measurement on effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338944
Cover Image
Performance Pay and Risk Aversion
Grund, Christian; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006
substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333738
Cover Image
Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss
Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2006
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335185
Cover Image
Social relations and relational incentives
Dur, Robert A. J.; Tichem, Jan - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722629
Cover Image
Performance pay and risk aversion
Grund, Christian; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006
substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365868
Cover Image
Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss : presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute, Workshop on Dissecting Globalization, July 2004
Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of his employer. This paper uses a principalagent model to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450877
Cover Image
Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Sliwka, Dirk - 2007
An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types a third type of agents is introduced: These quot;conformistsquot; have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do too....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778314
Cover Image
Altruism and relational incentives in the workplace
Dur, Robert A. J.; Tichem, Jan - 2013
; subjective performance evaluation ; Nash bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009739554