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Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss
Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2006
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335185
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Social relations and relational incentives
Dur, Robert A. J.; Tichem, Jan - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722629
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Altruism and relational incentives in the workplace
Dur, Robert A. J.; Tichem, Jan - 2013
; subjective performance evaluation ; Nash bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009739554
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Social relations and relational incentives
Dur, Robert A. J.; Tichem, Jan - 2012
relations ; incentives ; relational contracts ; efficiency wages ; subjective performance evaluation ; Nash bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009540101
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Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss : presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute, Workshop on Dissecting Globalization, July 2004
Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of his employer. This paper uses a principalagent model to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450877
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Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; Roelfsema, Hein - 2008
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377049
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Dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay : a field experiment
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; … - 2013
performance pay. Employees in the randomly selected treatment stores could win a bonus by outperforming three comparable stores … from the control group over the course of four weeks. Treatment stores received weekly feedback on relative performance …. Control stores were kept unaware of their involvement, so that their performance generates exogenous variation in the relative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010196033
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Dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay : a field experiment
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; … - 2013
performance pay. Employees in the randomly selected treatment stores could win a bonus by outperforming three comparable stores … from the control group over the course of four weeks. Treatment stores received weekly feedback on relative performance …. Control stores were kept unaware of their involvement, so that their performance generates exogenous variation in the relative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382591