This paper examines the implications of insurers' offering a voluntary monitoring technology to insureds in automobile insurance markets with adverse selection and without commitment. Under the consideration of the inherent costs related to the loss of privacy, the paper analyzes the incentives...

We examine the effects of ex post revelation of information about the risk type or the risk-reducing behavior of insureds in automobile insurance markets both for perfect competition and for monopoly. Specifically, we assume that insurers can offer a contract with information revelation ex post,...

This paper examines the implications of insurers? offering a voluntary monitoring technology to insureds in automobile insurance markets with adverse selection and without commitment. Under the consideration of the inherent costs related to the loss of privacy, the paper analyzes the incentives...

We examine the effects of ex post revelation of information about the risk type or the risk-reducing behavior of insureds in automobile insurance markets both for perfect competition and for monopoly. Specifically, we assume that insurers can offer a contract with information revelation ex post,...

This paper examines the implications of insurers’ offering a voluntary monitoring technology to insureds in automobile insurance markets with adverse selection and without commitment. Under the consideration of the inherent costs related to the loss of privacy, the paper analyzes the...

This paper examines the implications of insurers’ offering a voluntary monitoring technology to insureds in automobile insurance markets with adverse selection and without commitment. Under the consideration of the inherent costs related to the loss of privacy, the paper analyzes the...