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Stealth compensation via retirement benefits

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M. - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002221271

Stealth compensation via retirement benefits

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M. - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002250555

Executive compensation at Fannie Mae : a case study of perverse incentives, nonperformance pay, and camouflage

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M. - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002657828

Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M.; Walker, David I. - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001685998

Executive compensation in America : optimal contracting or extraction of rents?

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M.; Walker, David I. - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001628673

Executive compensation in America : optimal contracting or extraction of rents?

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M.; Walker, David I. - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001632911

Executive compensation as an agency problem

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M. - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001760537

Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M.; Walker, David I. - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001674423

Executive compensation as an agency problem

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M. - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001773447

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2003

This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a managerial power' approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012786483