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Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives

Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2024

We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014552994

Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives

Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014493793

Multitasking and the benefits of objective performance measurement : evidence from a field experiment ; conference paper

Manthei, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk - 2013 - Preliminary version

We examine the benefits of objective performance measurement in a field experiment conducted in a retail bank. At the … outset objective performance measures of pro fits in each branch were only available on the branch level and managers … to individual performance measures. We find a significant positive impact of objective performance measurement on effort …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338944

Performance Pay and Risk Aversion

Grund, Christian; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006

substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333738

Optimal tournament contracts for heterogeneous workers

Gürtler, Oliver; Kräkel, Matthias - 2008

We analyze the optimal design of rank-order tournaments with heterogeneous workers. Iftournament prizes do not differ between the workers(uniform prizes), as in the previous tournament literature, the outcome will be ineffcient. In the case of limited liability, the employer may benefit from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383017

Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors

Giebe, Thomas; Gürtler, Oliver - 2008

report the agent's performance truthfully, while all others report favorably independent of performance. This implies that … overstated performance (leniency bias) may be the outcome of optimal contracts under informational asymmetries. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365849

Feedback in tournaments under commitment problems : theory and experimental evidence

Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - 2007

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals in-termediate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365864

Performance pay and risk aversion

Grund, Christian; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006

substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365868

On delegation under relational contracts

Gürtler, Oliver - 2006

In this paper, a principal's decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365874

Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes

Sliwka, Dirk - 2007

An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types a third type of agents is introduced: These quot;conformistsquot; have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do too....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778314