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This paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences concerning fiscal policy alternate in office as a result of democratic elections. It is shown that in this situation government debt becomes a strategic variable used by each policymaker to influence the choices of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013323574
We introduce a democratic procedure with voting-based proposals called "Pendular Voting". It works as follows: An … manipulability and exploitation of this voting procedure and its welfare effects. We show that manipulation is limited or absent and … that exploitation can be avoided. Regardless of whether the agenda-setter is altruistic or selfish, Pendular Voting leads …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012544186
This paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences concerning fiscal policy alternate in office as a result of democratic elections. It is shown that in this situation government debt becomes a strategic variable used by each policymaker to influence the choices of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012476760
private information truthfully before voting takes place. Depending on the distance between two feasible public good levels …, the optimal mechanism involves either one or two voting rounds. We show that procedural efficiency cannot be achieved by … communication among all citizens prior to voting. Finally, we outline several applications of the mechanism. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444451
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We outline a new voting procedure for representative democracies. This procedure should be used for important decisions … only and consists of two voting rounds: a randomly-selected subset of the citizens is awarded a one-time voting right. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012984387
We study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in polarized democracies. We develop a simple election model where (i) reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change, and (ii) politicians differ in their ability to carry out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012985780
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