We examine whether it is socially beneficial for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be … efficient central bankers in their bid to get re-elected. After re-election, however, losses will be lower when voting records … and can make central bankers individually accountable. Nevertheless, the negative effects of voting transparency …

We examine whether it is socially beneficial for the individual voting records of centralWir untersuchen, ob die …

We examine whether the publication of the individual voting records of central-bank council members is socially … optimal behavior for somewhat less efficient central bankers. However, after re-appointment, losses will be lower when voting … and can make central bankers individually accountable. In our model, the negative effects of voting transparency dominate …

We introduce a democratic procedure with voting-based proposals called "Pendular Voting". It works as follows: An … manipulability and exploitation of this voting procedure and its welfare effects. We show that manipulation is limited or absent and … that exploitation can be avoided. Regardless of whether the agenda-setter is altruistic or selfish, Pendular Voting leads …