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Interdependence and democratic legitimation

Scharpf, Fritz W. - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008698827

Gersbach, Hans (contributor); Siemers, Lars (contributor) - 2005

We examine whether democratic societies can escape poverty traps. Unrestricted agenda setting with simple majority rules fail to educate a society, because education-enhancing redistribution will not occur. We show that a combination of suitable constitutional rules overcomes this impossibility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003039641

Information Aggregation in Democratic Mechanisms

Britz, Volker - 2016

private information truthfully before voting takes place. Depending on the distance between two feasible public good levels …, the optimal mechanism involves either one or two voting rounds. We show that procedural efficiency cannot be achieved by … communication among all citizens prior to voting. Finally, we outline several applications of the mechanism …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994342

Financing democracy

Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - 2002

Based on contribution patterns to parties in Germany and elsewhere, we suggest that democracies should use a mixed system where private funding can play a larger role than public funding. In Germany the high level of public funding for parties can be reduced without expecting undesirable effects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514063

Democratic Provision of Divisible Public Goods

Gersbach, Hans - 2010

In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a supermajority rule, equal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013147793

Can Democracy Educate a Society?

Gersbach, Hans; Siemers, Lars H.R - 2021

-setting only by ensuring subsistence levels of consumption and applying simple majority voting as decision rule fails to enable a … suitable constitutional rules can, however, overcome poverty and induce economic well-being. Besides majority voting, these …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318362

A Reform Dilemma in Polarized Democracies

Gersbach, Hans; Tejada, Oriol - 2016

We study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in polarized democracies. We develop a simple election model where (i) reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change, and (ii) politicians differ in their ability to carry out...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753319

Co-voting Democracy

Gersbach, Hans - 2016

We outline a new voting procedure for representative democracies. This procedure should be used for important decisions … only and consists of two voting rounds: a randomly-selected subset of the citizens is awarded a one-time voting right. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753320

Economic integration, democracy and the welfare state

Scharpf, Fritz W. - 1996

The present difficulties of democratic welfare states in Europe are often ascribed to economic "globalization", that is to the world-wide integration of markets for capital, goods and services which has eliminated national control over boundary-crossing economic transactions, and which therefore...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010302830

Democratic provision of divisible public goods

Gersbach, Hans - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266097