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We examine whether it is socially beneficial for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be … efficient central bankers in their bid to get re-elected. After re-election, however, losses will be lower when voting records … and can make central bankers individually accountable. Nevertheless, the negative effects of voting transparency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419080
We examine whether it is socially beneficial for the individual voting records of centralWir untersuchen, ob die …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012991307
We examine whether the publication of the individual voting records of central-bank council members is socially … optimal behavior for somewhat less efficient central bankers. However, after re-appointment, losses will be lower when voting … and can make central bankers individually accountable. In our model, the negative effects of voting transparency dominate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014149119
This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members … publication of voting records is beneficial since the government can distinguish central bankers in terms of their preferences and … berücksichtigen, dass sie vielleicht nicht wiedergewählt werden. Die Veröffentlichung der Abstimmung ist somit nützlich, weil die …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419124
We introduce 'Balanced Voting', a new voting scheme that is particularly suitable for making fundamental societal …, and others that care much less. In a two-stage procedure, Balanced Voting works as follows: Citizens may abstain from … voting on a fundamental direction in a first stage. In a second voting stage, this guarantees them a voting right on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013029765
We present a variant of a general equilibrium model with group formation to study how changes of non-consumptive benefits from group formation impact on the well-being of group members. We identify a human relations paradox: Positive externalities increase, but none of the group members gains in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009236279
Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009009663
In this paper we introduce flexible majority decision rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal made by the agenda setter. Flexible majority rules can mitigate the disadvantages of democracies in the provision of public projects. In many cases, the combination of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398428
Decoy ballots do not count in election outcomes, but otherwise they are indistinguishable from real ballots. By means of a game-theoretical model, we show that decoy ballots may not provide effective protection against a malevolent adversary trying to buy real ballots. If the citizenry is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011787216
We integrate individual power in groups into general equilibrium models. The relationship between group formation, resource allocation, and the power of specific individuals or particular sociological groups is investigated. We introduce, via an illustrative example, three appealing concepts of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010484493