Recently a variety of link-based stability concepts have emerged in the literature on game theoretic models of social network formation. We investigate two basic formation properties that establish equivalence between some well known types of stable networks and their natural extensions. These...

We investigate the equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation that are based on individual actions only. Our approach is grounded in three simple and realistic principles: (1) Link formation should be a binary process of consent. (2) Link formation should be costly. (3) The class...

We consider game theoretic models of social network formation. In this paper, we limit our investigation to game theoretic models of network formation that are based on individual actions only. Our approach is based on three simple and realistic principles: (1) Link formation is a binary process...

In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decisionmakers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while...

Xiaokai Yang's theory of economic specialization under increasing returns to scale is a formal development of the fundamental Smith-Young theorem on the extent of the market and the social division of labor. In this theory specialization and, thus, the social division of labor is firmly embedded...

A ranking method assigns to every weighted directed graph a (weak) orderingof the nodes. In this paper we axiomatize the ranking method that ranksthe nodes according to their outflow using four independent axioms. This outflowranking method generalizes the ranking by outdegree for directed...

We consider a class of cooperative network games with transferable utilities in which players interact through a probabilistic network rather than a regular, deterministic network. In this class of wealth-generating situations we consider probabilistic extensions of the Myerson value and the...

We investigate Gately's solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Gately's conception is a bargaining solution and minimises the maximal quantified 'propensity to disrupt' the negotiation of the players over the allocation of the generated collective payoffs. Gately's...

We consider a relational economy in which economic agents participate in three types of relational economic activities: autarkic activities; binary matching activities; and plural cooperative activities. We introduce a stability notion and characterize stable interaction structures, both in the...

A ranking method assigns to every weighted directed graph a (weak) ordering of the nodes. In this paper we axiomatize the ranking method that ranks the nodes according to their outflow using four independent axioms. This outflow ranking method generalizes the ranking by outdegree for directed...