We develop an algorithm that mimics the relative performance evaluation (“RPE”) peer selection process used for CEOs’ incentive plans. Our algorithm constructs the portfolio of peer firms that exhibits the highest in-sample stock performance correlation with the focal firm, which we then...

We compute and compare risk-adjusted pay for US and UK CEOs, where the adjustment is based on estimated risk premiums stemming from the equity incentives borne by CEOs. Controlling for firm and industry characteristics, we find that US CEOs have higher pay, but also bear much higher stock and...

We review recent literature on the role of financial reporting transparency in reducing governance-related agency conflicts among managers, directors, and shareholders, as well as in reducing agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, and offer researchers some suggested avenues for...

We evaluate the influence of measurement error in analysts' forecasts on the accuracy of implied cost of capital estimates from various implementations of the ‘implied cost of capital' approach, and develop corrections for the measurement error. We document predictable error in the implied...

Prior turnover literature documents that poor performance leads a board of directors to terminate the CEO, but does not explore the underlying causes of the CEO's poor performance. Recognizing that terminated CEOs have often been successful earlier in their tenure, we conjecture that changes in...

A growing literature documents that complex financial statements negatively affect the information environment. In this paper, we examine whether managers use voluntary disclosure to mitigate these negative effects. Employing cross-sectional and within-firm designs, we find a robust positive...

We review recent literature on the role of corporate financial reporting and transparency in reducing governance-related agency conflicts between managers, directors, shareholders, and other stakeholders — most notably regulators — and suggest some avenues for future research. Key themes...

We analyze a model of voluntary disclosure where investors impose a discount for uncertainty about firm value. We find a commitment to conservative reporting, defined as a requirement that firms disclose bad realizations of economic events, results in firm prices being higher on average....

We predict and find that firms use annual grants of options and restricted stock to CEOs to manage the optimal level of equity incentives. We model optimal equity incentive levels for CEOs, and use the residuals from this model to measure deviations between CEOs' holdings of equity incentives...