The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal … called compromise stable if the core is equal to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal vectors. In … larginal vector of the set is a core element, then the game is compromise stable. The first characterization of these sets is …

cooperative games with transferable utility. This notion is used to axiomatically characterize the core on the domain of convex … value, (b) all homothetic images of the core with the Shapley value as center of homothety and with positive ratios of …

We generalize the characterizations of the positive core and the positive prekernel to TU games with precedence … constraints and show that the positive core is characterized by non-emptiness (NE), boundedness (BOUND), covariance under … generalized Davis-Maschler reduced games, and the possibility of nondiscrimination. The bounded positive core, i.e., the union of …

It is well-known that the core on several domains of cooperative transferable utility (TU) and nontransferable utility … is shown that, if communication structures are present, the core may still be characterized on balanced TU games, on … totally balanced TU games, on NTU games with a nonempty core, on the domains of all TU or NTU games, and on several other …

, it is shown that a decreasing unit price function is a sufficient condition for a non-empty core: the Direct Price … solution is both a core element and a marginal vector. It is seen that the nucleolus of an MCP-game can be derived in …

costs such that each agent demands consecutive sections. We show that the core, the prenucleolus, and the Shapley value on … associated games do not occur. The main axioms for the core and the nucleolus are consistency properties based on the reduced …

characterise core stability of chain-component additive games in terms of polynomial many linear inequalities and equalities that … arise from the combinatorial structure of the game. Furthermore we show that core stability is equivalent to essential … extendibility. We also obtain that largeness of the core as well as extendibility and exactness of the game are equivalent …

. Moreover, we prove that the core of an FRP game coincides with the core of a related concave fixed tree game. We show how to … find the nucleolus, and we characterize the orders which provide marginal vectors in the core of an FRP game …