We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies...

We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies...

We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies...

The paper analyzes the implications of allowing for trade deflection under the restricted origin principle. It is shown that (a) producer trade deflection leads to circular trade and must be ruled out to obtain a trade equilibrium, (b) consumer trade deflection will not occur in a Nash...

The paper compares non-cooperative commodity taxation under the destination and origin principles under a variety of different assumptions about market structure. We consider a model of international duopoly with either quantity or price competition of firms and either segmented or integrated...

We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies...

The paper analyzes the implications of allowing for trade deflection under the restricted origin principle. It is shown that (a) producer trade deflection leads to circular trade and must be ruled out to obtain a trade equilibrium, (b) consumer trade deflection will not occur in a Nash...