Similar Search Results

Sovereign risk premia : the link between fiscal rules and stability culture

Heinemann, Friedrich; Osterloh, Steffen; Kalb, Alexander - 2013 - This version: March 2013

There is a growing empirical literature studying whether fiscal rules reduce borrowing costs. Nevertheless, it remains an open question whether these rules are effective genuinely or just because they mirror fiscal preferences of politicians and voters. In our analysis of European bond spreads,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009721879

A viable insolvency procedure for sovereigns (VIPS) in the euro area

Fuest, Clemens; Heinemann, Friedrich; Schröder, Christoph - 2014

A mechanism to restructure the debt of an insolvent euro country is a missing element in the emerging institutional architecture of the euro area. The introduction of an insolvency procedure for sovereigns faces a dilemma: In the foreseeable future, its introduction would risk pushing Europe...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010394484

The political cconomy of corporate tax harmonization : why do European politicians (dis)like minimum tax rates?

Osterloh, Steffen (contributor); … - 2008

Setting minimum tax rates is a well discussed way of mitigating pressure from tax competition. This paper investigates which motives shape the support for a minimum corporate tax among politicians. We make use of a unique data base: a survey among members of the European parliament. Our results...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003793773

Who's afraid of an EU tax and why? : revenue system preferences in the European Parliament

Heinemann, Friedrich (contributor); … - 2008

The EU's revenue system is still typical for an organisation based on international cooperation and stands in contrast … to the Union's far advanced legislative and political role. This contrast feeds the debate on granting the EU an … autonomous tax source. Our contribution explores the factors which shape the acceptance of the EU tax option among European …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003721754

Reconciling insurance with market discipline : a blueprint for a European fiscal union

Dolls, Mathias; Fuest, Clemens; Heinemann, Friedrich; … - 2016

This contribution develops a blueprint for a European fiscal union. We argue that a viable European fiscal union can be constructed without joint liability for public debt or a centralized government with a large common budget. Such a fiscal union should combine elements of market discipline...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431564

EMU and fiscal discipline : the end of the depreciation threat

Heinemann, Friedrich - 1998

Are the characteristics of the exchange rate regime relevant for the degree of fiscal discipline? What are the conclusions for fiscal behavior in Europe after the transition to EMU? These are the central questions that are analyzed in this paper from a theoretical point of view. After a general...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441669

Do fiscal rules constrain fiscal policy? : a meta-regression-analysis

Heinemann, Friedrich; Moessinger, Marc-Daniel; Yeter, … - 2016

We implement a meta-regression-analysis for the budgetary impact of numerical fiscal rules. Based on 30 studies published in the last decade, we offer a consensus estimate with respect to the level of statistical significance, provide suggestive evidence for the effect size, and identify study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444762

Reconciling insurance with market discipline : a blueprint for a European fiscal union

Dolls, Mathias; Fuest, Clemens; Heinemann, Friedrich; … - 2015

This contribution develops a blueprint for a European fiscal union. The proposal addresses the shortcomings of most other reform designs which do not offer a solution for insolvent or noncooperative euro countries. We suggest a design which combines fiscal insurance with an orderly procedure to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011300749

Die Europäische Investitionsbank : subsidiärer Finanzintermediär oder Umverteilungsinstrument?

Heinemann, Friedrich - 1992

Die Europäische Investitionsbank (EIB) mobilisiert in quantitativ bedeutendem Ausmaß Finanzmittel für EG-Politikfelder außerhalb des EG-Haushalts. Die von der Bonität des Schuldners abhängige implizite Zinssubvention ist wohlfahrtstheoretisch nicht zu rechtfertigen. Es ist zu vermuten,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621697

Verschuldungsanreize in der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion

Heinemann, Friedrich - 1994

Die Bestimmungen zur europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (WWU) im Unionsvertrag haben die Anreize für öffentliche Verschuldung verändert. Die Analyse zeigt, daß trotz der Bemühungen, die nationale Eigenverantwortlichkeit zu bewahren, nicht mit einer effektiven Disziplinierung...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621819