This paper moves toward the formulation of a normative theory of taxation that incorporates collective choice as an essential element. Such a theory has many interesting parallels to optimal taxation, including large information requirements for political agents. The paper discusses possible...

To the political economist, the variety of observed forms of taxation presents an interesting research challenge and raises a number of important questions. Can the seemingly confusing array of data be classified in a meaningful way? Is it possible to explain both differences and similarities in...

A new view is emerging in the economic literature on how to analyze and interpret national and subnational revenue systems. Recent work has shown that such systems can be modelled successfully as sets of related policy instruments that are being shaped and used deliberately by vote-maximizing...

The paper draws attention to the interdependence of regulation and taxation. We analyze the nature of policy equilibrium, as well as the implications of historically important political and economic shocks, for the joint use of the two policy instruments in a framework that embodies...