Showing 1 - 10 of 17
short and medium term, up to five years after displacement. Our analysis is based on rich administrative data from Germany …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011596874
Die Bundesagentur für Arbeit hat im Mai 2007 ein Pilotprojekt gestartet, bei dem in 14 Dienststellen der Betreuungssschlüssel (Zahl der Arbeitslosen pro Vermittler) deutlich reduziert wurde. Da die teilnehmenden Dienststellen nicht zufällig ausgewählt wurden, ist bei der Evaluation eine...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003874351
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418245
of publicly subsidized employment. The intention of the Federal Government of securing the effectiveness and efficiency … instruments available. The changes affect both active employment promotion (Book III of the Social Code) as well as specific … current challenges - Setting the course for gainful work, full employment and maintaining a sufficient supply of skilled …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010228692
In its statement, IAB comments first on the petition "Enforcing the rights of people in search of employment - defer … process of reintegration into employment, and taking various means to ensure eye-level cooperation of jobcentres and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010228696
In Germany, so-called "integration agreements" between labor market agencies and job seekers stipulate placement … efforts of the Employment Agency as well as the job search requirements of the job seekers. A pilot project examines the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010419500
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449662
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000204
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001341
In the German unemployment insurance system, Integration Agreements (IA) are mandatory contracts between the employment … this. The results show that IAs early in the spell have on average a small positive effect on entering employment within a … adverse prospects. Among them, being assigned to an early IA increases the probability of re-employment within a year from 45 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251531