Als letzter Redner im Sommersemester 2003 referierte Prof. Dr. Wernhard Möschel, Universität Tübingen, am 7. Juli im »Münchner Seminar« am ifo Institut zum Thema Tarifautonomie und Lohnfindung. Insbesondere zeigte er Möglichkeiten auf, im gegebenen rechtlichen Rahmen dem...

Als letzter Redner im Sommersemester 2003 referierte Prof. Dr. Wernhard Möschel, Universität Tübingen, am 7. Juli im »Münchner Seminar« am ifo Institut zum Thema Tarifautonomie und Lohnfindung. Insbesondere zeigte er Möglichkeiten auf, im gegebenen rechtlichen Rahmen dem...

When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise if workers do not know where other workers apply to (this affects network creation) and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider (this affects network clearing). We show that those frictions and the...

When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise if workers do not know where other workers apply to (this affects network creation) and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider (this affects network clearing). We show that those frictions and the...

When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise because workers typically do not know where other workers apply to and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider. The first coordination friction affects network formation, while the second...

When workers send applications to vacancies they create a bipartite network. Coordination frictions arise if workers and firms only observe their own links. We show that those frictions and the wage mechanism are in general not independent. Only wage mechanisms that allow for ex post competition...