This paper examines the role of the burden of proof (BoP) in National Treatment (NT) disputes under trade agreements. In the situation under study, imports may cause environmental damage, in which case less favorable treatment of imported products may be globally desirable from an international...

We examine the setting of national competition policy in a two-country setting,emphasizing the relationship of trade to the goals of competition policy (suchas the degree and nature of competition). The issues we address involve thegeneral equilibrium distributional effects of competition...

We study the potential loss in social welfare and changes in incentives to invest in R&D that result when the market leading firm is deprived of its position. We show that under plausible assumptions like free entry or repeated market interactions there is a social value of market leadership and...

The important characteristic of international competition between developed and less developed countries is vertical product differentiation, where firms' quality choices represent strategic decisions. Unlike the previous literature, we allow for a leadership in quality choice and the...

In this paper, we analyze the following policy dilemma: strategic trade policy versus free trade when the domestic government is bound to intervene only after the domestic firm's strategic variable is chosen. This intervention allows the domestic firm to manipulate the domestic government and...

We compare the social welfare generated by a domestic government in the two types of policy setups: a "commitment" regime in which the government sets its policy instrument before the strategic choice is made by the domestic firm and a "non-commitment" regime where the policy variable is set...

It is well known that tariff policy can alleviate the negative consequences of breaching intellectual property rights by foreign firms. Yet, the positive effect of tariff protection is thought to be the benefit firms get at the expense of consumers (at least in the short run). Using a set-up in...

In this paper, we analyze the following policy dilemma: strategic trade policy versus free trade when the domestic government is bound to intervene only after the domestic firm's strategic variable is chosen. This intervention allows the domestic firm to manipulate the domestic government and...

We compare the social welfare generated by a domestic government in the two types of policy setups: a "commitment" regime in which the government sets its policy instrument before the strategic choice is made by the domestic firm and a "non-commitment" regime where the policy variable is set...

We analyze a simple "tariffs cum foreign competition" policy targeted at enhancing the competitive position of a domestic, developing country firm that competes with its developed country counterpart on the domestic market and that carries out an innovative (imitative) effort. We evaluate this...