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This paper examines the effectiveness of cheap talk when the receiver is imperfectly informed. We show that the receiver’s prior knowledge becomes an impediment to efficient communication in a model with the discrete state space: in general, the more the receiver is informed, the less...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921775
In most firms, if not all, workers are divided asymmetrically in terms of authority and responsibility. In this paper, we view the asymmetric allocations of authority and responsibility as essential features of hierarchy and examine why hierarchies often prevail in organizations from that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921797
In most firms, if not all, workers are divided asymmetrically in terms of authority and responsibility. In this paper, we view the asymmetric allocations of authority and responsibility as essential features of hierarchy and examine why hierarchies often prevail in organizations from that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010406850
In this paper we analyze a cheap talk model with a partially informed receiver. In clear contrast to the previous literature, we find that there is a case where the receiver's prior knowledge enhances the amount of information conveyed via cheap talk. The point of departure is our explicit focus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009516783
In most firms, if not all, workers are divided asymmetrically in terms of authority and responsibility. In this paper, we view the asymmetric allocations of authority and responsibility as essential features of hierarchy and examine why hierarchies often prevail in organizations from that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013046844
In most firms, if not all, workers are divided asymmetrically in terms of authority and Responsibility. In this paper, we view the asymmetric allocations of authority and responsibility as essential features of hierarchy and examine why hierarchies often prevail in organizations From that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204676
This paper considers a model of strategic information transmission with an imperfectly informed receiver and provides a simple logic by which the receiver's prior knowledge becomes an impediment to efficient communication. We show that the extent of communication is severely limited as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206893