Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly … dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this … von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present roommate …

Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly … dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this … von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present roommate …

order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links …

We extend Jackson and Watts's (2002) result on the coincidence of S-stochastically stable and core stable networks from … marriage problems to roommate problems. In particular, we show that the existence of a side-optimal core stable network, on …

We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may …

We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain … with transitivity of blocking leads to an elementary proof of the so-called stable median matching theorem, showing how the …-sided matching problems …

In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in … matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be …