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All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with Social Norm Against Lying
Korpela, Ville - 2014
constraint in implementation and all incentive compatible social choice functions are Bayesian implementable. In contrast to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503049
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An iterative approach to rationalizable implementation
Jain, Ritesh; Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele - 2022
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013205590
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Behavioral Strong Implementation
Hayashi, Takashi; Jain, Ritesh; Korpela, Ville; … - 2020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012405426
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Implementation with farsighted agents
Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Vartiainen, Hannu - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012433566
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Behavioral strong implementation
Hayashi, Takashi; Jain, Ritesh; Korpela, Ville; … - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012433571
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An iterative approach to rationalizable implementation
Jain, Ritesh; Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013368317
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Two-player rationalizable implementation
Jain, Ritesh; Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele - 2022
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014227238
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All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with Social Norm Against Lying
Korpela, Ville - Turun Kauppakorkeakoulu, Turun Yliopisto - 2014
constraint in implementation and all incentive compatible social choice functions are Bayesian implementable. In contrast to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096879