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Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives
Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2024
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014552994
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Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives
Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2024
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014493793
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Multitasking and the benefits of objective performance measurement : evidence from a field experiment ; conference paper
Manthei, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk - 2013 - Preliminary version
We examine the benefits of objective performance measurement in a field experiment conducted in a retail bank. At the … outset objective performance measures of pro fits in each branch were only available on the branch level and managers … to individual performance measures. We find a significant positive impact of objective performance measurement on effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338944
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Performance Pay and Risk Aversion
Grund, Christian; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006
substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333738
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Optimal tournament contracts for heterogeneous workers
Gürtler, Oliver; Kräkel, Matthias - 2008
We analyze the optimal design of rank-order tournaments with heterogeneous workers. Iftournament prizes do not differ between the workers(uniform prizes), as in the previous tournament literature, the outcome will be ineffcient. In the case of limited liability, the employer may benefit from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383017
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Performance pay and risk aversion
Grund, Christian; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006
substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365868
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Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Sliwka, Dirk - 2007
An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types a third type of agents is introduced: These quot;conformistsquot; have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do too....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778314
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On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Sliwka, Dirk - 2021
performance measurement is costly. If social norms matter such that some agents' reliability is influenced by their beliefs on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319811
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Multitasking and subjective performance evaluations : theory and evidence from a field experiment in a bank
Manthei, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk - 2018
We study the incentive effects of grating supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on … objective measures but assess performance subjectively by gathering information. This incentive loss is more pronounced when the … experiment conducted in a bank. In the treatment group managers obtained access to objective performance measures which raised …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011871952
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Performance Pay and Risk Aversion
Grund, Christian; Sliwka, Dirk - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835229