We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …

We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …

aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is … production process. Imperfect performance measurement always lowers profit under multitasking, but may increase profit under …

We examine the benefits of objective performance measurement in a field experiment conducted in a retail bank. At the … outset objective performance measures of pro fits in each branch were only available on the branch level and managers … to individual performance measures. We find a significant positive impact of objective performance measurement on effort …

substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …

performance measurement is costly. If social norms matter such that some agents' reliability is influenced by their beliefs on the …

substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …

performance measurement is costly. If social norms matter such that some agents' reliability is influenced by their beliefs on the …

, ex-post losses in shareholder value may be offset by ex-ante gains in performance through higher employee motivation. …