agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reflects the agent's individual …

economic explanation for this paradox, linked to the multitasking problem in managing family firms. We compare the performance … of family and non-family managers in a moral-hazard model with imperfect performance measures, where managerial tasks are …-economic goals. However, the more complementary the tasks, the more aligned the performance measure with the family's goals, and the …

. In our model, two tasks contribute to non-veriable firm value and affect an imperfect performance measure. The tasks can …

I compare group to individual performance pay when workers are envious and performance is non-verifiable. Avoiding …

. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reflects an agent's individual contribution to firm …

aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is … production process. Imperfect performance measurement always lowers profit under multitasking, but may increase profit under …