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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010410775
We derive equilibrium asset prices when fund managers deviate from benchmark indices to exploit noise-trader induced distortions but fund investors constrain these deviations. Because constraints force managers to buy assets that they underweight when these assets appreciate, overvalued assets...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047402
, investors make managers' fees more sensitive to performance and benchmark performance against a market index. This makes … overvalued assets. Socially optimal contracts provide steeper performance incentives and cause larger pricing distortions than …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458188
We derive equilibrium asset prices when fund managers deviate from benchmark indices to exploit noise-trader induced distortions but fund investors constrain these deviations. Because constraints force managers to buy assets that they underweight when these assets appreciate, overvalued assets...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904735
performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are non-verifiable so that … where the agent gets a bonus if a weighted sum of per-formance outcomes on the various tasks (the index) exceeds a hurdle … this reason be beneficial. For a similar reason, the principal may also want to include verifiable performance measures in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013243235
performance measures. However, there is no formal incentive model that actually describe this kind of index contracts as an … optimal solution. In this paper, we show that an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are non … sum of performance outcomes on the various tasks (the index) exceeds a hurdle. For a parametric (multinormal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014032096
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013548065
performance. The two cases reveal that it may be optimal to organize production as a team where only aggregate output is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013053067
This paper examines the self-enforcing conditions of linear contracts commonly used in agriculture. In a repeated game between a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent, I show that when contracts are constrained by the requirement of being self-enforcing, risk aversion and variance can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064242
performance, in a relational contract between a principal and a team of two agents. A main result is that the optimal incentive … will see a higher frequency of relative performance evaluation (RPE) - and schemes that lie close to independent … performance evaluation - as we move from low-productive to high-productive environments. In particular, it is shown that if effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027830