Showing 1 - 10 of 11
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result of this paper states that every contract choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312378
We show that a simple generalisation of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley (1962) yields outcomes for a generalised marriage problem, which are necessarily stable. We also show that any outcome of this procedure is Weakly Pareto Optimal for Men, i.e....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325145
We show that, given two matchings for a room-mates problem of which say the second is stable, and given a non-empty subset of agents S if (a) no agent in S prefers the first matching to the second, and (b) no agent in S and his room-mate in S under the second matching prefer each other to their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325151
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result of this paper states that every contract choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990064
The main result in this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty quasi-bargaining set. The need for such a solution concept which is considerably weaker than the core arises, since it is well known that even for very simple contract choice problems, the core and bargaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222434
We show that a simple generalisation of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley (1962) yields outcomes for a generalised marriage problem, which are necessarily stable. We also show that any outcome of this procedure is Weakly Pareto Optimal for Men, i.e....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011593642
We show that, given two matchings for a room-mates problem of which say the second is stable, and given a non-empty subset of agents S if (a) no agent in S prefers the first matching to the second, and (b) no agent in S and his room-mate in S under the second matching prefer each other to their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011593838
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result of this paper states that every contract choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059800
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724416
We show that a simple generalisation of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley (1962) yields outcomes for a generalised marriage problem, which are necessarily stable. We also show that any outcome of this procedure is Weakly Pareto Optimal for Men, i.e....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014073889