We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …

We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …

with these numbers is that they are static and do not reflect how pay changes with performance. Activist fund ValueAct … relation between pay and performance?• Are large “minimum” payments indicative of managerial abuse?• What insights does this …

We examine the benefits of objective performance measurement in a field experiment conducted in a retail bank. At the … outset objective performance measures of pro fits in each branch were only available on the branch level and managers … to individual performance measures. We find a significant positive impact of objective performance measurement on effort …

substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …

-facilitating accounting information on the profit margins of individual products and (ii) whether they receive performance pay based on an …

compensation has a negative association with future firm operating performance. However, significant variation in CEO talent and … future performance is mitigated when the firm has a high level of CEO talent, and exacerbated when the firm has low … talent motivations explain more of the variation in the future performance implications of peer-group choice than corporate …

substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …

We study the incentive effects of grating supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on … objective measures but assess performance subjectively by gathering information. This incentive loss is more pronounced when the … experiment conducted in a bank. In the treatment group managers obtained access to objective performance measures which raised …