In a two-good setting we axiomatize (a) preferences with subsistence consumption and (b) a generalized version of Leontief preferences. Our axiomatization allows for different levels of subsistence and captures the presence of poverty and prosperity. Our axioms are based on the irrelevance of...

In a two-good setting we axiomatize (a) preferences with subsistence consumption and (b) a generalized version of Leontief preferences. Our axiomatization allows for different levels of subsistence and captures the presence of poverty and prosperity. Our axioms are based on the irrelevance of...

In this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when the regulator faces a budget constraint. The optimal budget-constrained mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient firms produce the same quantity. The second...

Why do political constituencies delegate decision power to representative assemblies? And how is the size of such assemblies determined? We analyze these questions of constitutional design in a model with voters learning their preferred alternative only after engaging in costly information...

In this paper we consider the problem of regulating an open access essential facility. A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market under the roof of a regulatory mechanism. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both competitors use...