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Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments

Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

We provide an overview of experimental literature on contests and point out the two main phenomena observed in most contest experiments- (i) overbidding relative to the standard Nash equilibrium prediction and (ii) heterogeneous behavior of ex-ante symmetric contestants. Based on the sample of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817423

Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-Bidding in Contests

Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2009

This study reports an experiment that examines whether groups can better comply with theoretical predictions than … individuals in contests. Our experiment replicates previous findings that individual players significantly overbid relative to … individual players. The new findings of our experiment are that groups make 25% lower bids, their bids have lower variance, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008556045

The attack and defense of weakest-link networks

Kovenock, Dan; Roberson, Brian; Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2010

This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker's objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender's objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274929

Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence

Shupp, Robert; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Schmidt, David; … - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817382

An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2009

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306996

An experimental investigation of colonel blotto games

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265974

The New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests

Irfanoglu, Zeynep B.; Mago, Shakun D.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2014

This experimental study compares sequential and simultaneous election contests. Consistent with the theory, we find evidence of the “New Hampshire effect” in the sequential contests, i.e., the winner of the first electoral battle wins the overall contest with much higher probability than the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884877

Trust, Reciprocity and Rules

Rietz, Thomas A.; Schniter, Eric; Sheremeta, Roman M.; … - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2011

In the absence of enforceable contracts, many economic and personal interactions rely on trust and reciprocity. Research shows that although this reliance often works well, sometimes it breaks down. Simple rules mandating minimum standards on reciprocation prevent the most egregious trust...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009295318

Resolving Conflicts by a Random Device

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2011

We examine conflict resolution via a random device. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for a fixed prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate the prize by coin flip to avoid the costs of conflict. In equilibrium, risk-neutral agents with relatively...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323518

Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict.

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve the dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647549