We simultaneously analyze two mechanisms of the managerial labor market (CEO turnover and remuneration schemes) in two different regulatory regimes, namely before and after the sweeping governance reforms adopted in the UK in the 1990s. We employ sample selection models to examine firms in a...

This paper offers a new explanation of the gender pay gap in leadership positions by examining the relationship between managerial bonuses and company performance. Drawing on findings of gender studies, agency theory, and the leadership literature, we argue that the gender pay gap is a...

We study if a CEO's equity-based compensation affects the expected value generation in takeovers. When the objectives of management and shareholders are more aligned, as proxied by the use of equity-based compensation, more value-maximizing acquisitions are expected. Whereas in widely-held firms...

We investigate whether acquisition experience of executive and non-executive directors is priced in their remuneration. We find that acquisition experience generates a contractual premium, and the relative size of this premium is higher for non-executive directors than for executives. Only a...

We analyze the payout channel choice of listed UK firms and examine whether the choice between dividends, share repurchases, a combination of payout channels, or complete earnings retention is affected by investor sentiment, taxation, major shareholder ownership, and in particular the CEO's...

We take a state-stewardship view on the corporate governance model and executive compensation policies in economies with strong political involvement. In such a highly politically-oriented institutional environment, the business elites are not just professional managers but are also de facto...

We investigate whether acquisition experience of executive and non-executive directors is priced in their remuneration. We find that acquisition experience generates a contractual premium, and the relative size of this premium is higher for non-executive directors than for executives. Only a...