We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …

We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …

substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …

substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …

We study the incentive effects of grating supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on … objective measures but assess performance subjectively by gathering information. This incentive loss is more pronounced when the … experiment conducted in a bank. In the treatment group managers obtained access to objective performance measures which raised …

Incentive schemes affect performance and priorities of agents but, in reality, they can be complicated even for simple … and economically important for performance. We find that higher salience of incentives for quantity increases quantity …

Incentive schemes affect performance and priorities of agents but, in reality, they can be complicated even for simple … and economically important for performance. We find that higher salience of incentives for quantity increases quantity …