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Delegation of Task Allocation Authority and the Value of Communication when Performance Measures are Imperfect

Rohlfing-Bastian, Anna - 2019

costs are non-verifiable ex-post and the team performance measure exhibits congruency problems, the principal even wants to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012870040

Wage floors, imperfect performance measures, and optimal job design : conference paper

Kragl, Jenny; Schöttner, Anja - 2013

aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is … production process. Imperfect performance measurement always lowers profit under multitasking, but may increase profit under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339385

Asset management contracts and equilibrium prices

Buffa, Andrea; Vayanos, Dimitri; Woolley, Paul - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010410775

Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices

Buffa, Andrea M - 2019

We derive equilibrium asset prices when fund managers deviate from benchmark indices to exploit noise-trader induced distortions but fund investors constrain these deviations. Because constraints force managers to buy assets that they underweight when these assets appreciate, overvalued assets...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904735

Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices

Buffa, Andrea M - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047402

Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices

Buffa, Andrea M. - 2014

, investors make managers' fees more sensitive to performance and benchmark performance against a market index. This makes … overvalued assets. Socially optimal contracts provide steeper performance incentives and cause larger pricing distortions than …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458188

Asset management contracts and equilibrium prices

Buffa, Andrea M.; Vayanos, Dimitri; Woolley, Paul - In: Journal of political economy 130 (2022) 12, pp. 3146-3201

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013548065

Promotion tournaments and individual performance pay

Schöttner, Anja (contributor); Thiele, Veikko (contributor) - 2007

We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and individual performance pay in an employment … candidate. Thus, we give a possible explanation for why individual performance schemes are less often observed in practice than …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003634017

Wage floors and optimal job design

Kragl, Jenny; Schöttner, Anja - 2011

. In our model, two tasks contribute to non-veriable firm value and affect an imperfect performance measure. The tasks can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009125582

Precision in U-Type and J-Type Tournaments

Schöttner, Anja - 2005

In this paper I contrast the impact of precision, i.e., the level of accuracy with which workers' performance is … overall wage sum is specified. The principal can increase precision by including more signals in performance measurement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065088