Previous theoretical and empirical research has shown that policymakers have an incentive to centralize government activities in order to weaken the com-petitive pressure of fiscal federalism. We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to...

Previous theoretical and empirical research has shown that policymakers have an incentive to centralize government activities in order to weaken the competitive pressure of fiscal federalism. We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to...

This paper analyzes the impact of fiscal federalism on income inequality and redistribution. Theoretically contradicting arguments ask for empirical evidence to obtain a better knowledge of this relationship. We rely on the institutional setting in Switzerland to study the issue empirically....

This paper analyzes the impact of fiscal federalism on income inequality and redistribution. Economic theory delivers contradicting arguments such that empirical evidence is needed to shed light on the relationship. To obtain such evidence, we rely on the ideal institutional setting of...

We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur in jurisdictions with referendum decisions on policy centralization. Citizens choose centralization of public spending and revenue in order to internalize spillovers if individual...