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Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives
Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2024
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014493793
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Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives
Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2024
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014552994
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Task difficulty, performance measure characteristics and the trade-off between insurance and well-allocated effort
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2006
the performance measure and its similarity (congruity, congruence) to the benefit of the manager’s employer. A necessary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003379118
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Incentive design and mis-allocated effort : conference paper
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2013 - Preliminary version
Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This paper proposes a theory of incentive design allowing for such distorted behavior. At the heart of the theory is a trade-off between getting the agent to exert effort and ensuring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344596
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Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2010
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135820
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Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2021
the performance measure and its similarity (congruity, congruence) to the benefit of the manager's employer. A necessary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317592
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Task difficulty, performance measure characteristics, and the trade-off between insurance and well-allocated effort
Schnedler, Wendelin (contributor) - 2006
the performance measure and its similarity (congruity, congruence) to the benefit of the manager's employer. A necessary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003323166
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Hidden action, identification, and organization design
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2010
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009303451
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Multitasking and the benefits of objective performance measurement : evidence from a field experiment ; conference paper
Manthei, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk - 2013 - Preliminary version
We examine the benefits of objective performance measurement in a field experiment conducted in a retail bank. At the … outset objective performance measures of pro fits in each branch were only available on the branch level and managers … to individual performance measures. We find a significant positive impact of objective performance measurement on effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338944
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Performance Pay and Risk Aversion
Grund, Christian; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006
substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333738