Showing 1 - 10 of 24
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014552994
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014493793
We examine the benefits of objective performance measurement in a field experiment conducted in a retail bank. At the … outset objective performance measures of pro fits in each branch were only available on the branch level and managers … to individual performance measures. We find a significant positive impact of objective performance measurement on effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338944
substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333738
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722629
This paper studies how firms can efficiently incentivize supervisors to truthfully report employee performance. To this … altruism sometimes provides a net incentive to report performance truthfully, rather than to bias evaluations upward. The … risk by overrating the agent's performance. Second, I show that by screening for one supervisor type, firms can incentivize …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226565
substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365868
This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013105146
This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082165
An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types a third type of agents is introduced: These quot;conformistsquot; have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do too....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778314