We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …

We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …

We examine the benefits of objective performance measurement in a field experiment conducted in a retail bank. At the … outset objective performance measures of pro fits in each branch were only available on the branch level and managers … to individual performance measures. We find a significant positive impact of objective performance measurement on effort …

substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …

performance measurement is costly. If social norms matter such that some agents' reliability is influenced by their beliefs on the …

substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …

mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for managers who decide upon promotion. Second, we analyze matched employer … indeed substantially higher when managers receive performance-related pay or participate in gain sharing plans …

-facilitating accounting information on the profit margins of individual products and (ii) whether they receive performance pay based on an …