Showing 1 - 8 of 8
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors were not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003981608
Drawing on two large German representative data sets, we analyze the role of works councils for the use of performance appraisals (PA). We distinguish between the incidence of performance appraisal systems as intended by the firm and their actual implementation on the level of the individual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012861282
Drawing on two large German representative data sets, we analyze the role of works councils for the use of performance appraisals (PA). We distinguish between the incidence of performance appraisal systems as intended by the firm and their actual implementation on the level of the individual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012121631
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multi-rater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014552994
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multi-rater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014493793
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors were not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141429
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001784299
We experimentally investigate a simple version of Holmstroem's career concerns model in which firms compete for agents in two consecutive periods. Profits of firms are determined by agents' unknown ability and the effort they choose. Before making second-period wage offers firms are informed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075397