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I study the optimal choice of investment projects in a continuous time moral hazard model with multitasking. While in the first best, projects are invariably chosen by the net present value (NPV) criterion, moral hazard introduces a cutoff for project execution which depends on both a project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008989452
the contract into two regions. After sufficiently high performance, the agent reaches the over-compensation region, where … he receives excessive benefits compared to the contract without ambiguity, while after low performance, he enters the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009427192
cost. The robust contract generates a seemingly excessive pay-performance sensitivity. The worst-case effort cost is high … after good performance, but low after bad performance, which leads to overcompensation and undercompensation respectively … and provides a new rationale for using performance-sensitive debt. I also characterize the agent's incentives when the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905754
I study the optimal choice of investment projects in a continuous time moral hazard model with multitasking. While in the first best, projects are invariably chosen by the net present value (NPV) criterion, moral hazard introduces a cutoff for project execution which depends on both a project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008646
to an NPV criterion can occur on the path of the contract. As past performance increases, the firm chooses projects which … require higher pay-performance sensitivity. When the continuation value is large, investment projects are chosen more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012104572