Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante threat of sanctions. Based on a large inflow sample into unemployment … unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We estimate multispell …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

The influence of human capital, the local unemployment rate, the family situation, personal characteristics and the … social resources on the individual length of unemployment in Germany are analysed with data from the German Socio …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness absence during …