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Contract Duration and Investment Incentives: Evidence from Land Tenancy Agreements
Bandiera, Oriana - London School of Economics and Political Science - 2005
This paper analyses the empirical determinants of contract length, a key andyet neglected dimension of contractual … structure. I estimate contract length andcontract type jointly using original data on tenancy agreements signed between1870 and … 1880 in the district of Siracusa, Italy.The findings indicate that the choice of contract length is driven by theneed to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870994
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Contractual Structure and Endogenous Matching in Partnerships
Ghatak, Maitreesh; Karajvanov, Alexander K. - London School of Economics and Political Science; Simon … - 2011
We analyze optimal contracts and optimal matching patterns in a simple model of partnershipwhere there is a double-sided moral hazard problem and potential partners differ intheir productivity in two tasks. It is possible for one individual to accomplish both tasks (soleproduction) and there are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860709
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Repayment Frequency in Micro nance Contracts with Present-Biased Borrowers
Fischer, Greg; Ghatak, Maitreesh - London School of Economics and Political Science - 2010
This paper analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of high-frequency repayment, a featurein nearly all microfi…nance contracts that has been largely overlooked by theorists. The pervasive belief among practitioners that frequent repayment is critical in achieving high repaymentrates is puzzling....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860716
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Public-Private Partnerships for the Provision of Public Goods: Theory and an Application to NGOs
Besley, Timothy; Ghatak, Maitreesh - London School of Economics and Political Science - 1999
This paper analyzes the role of public and private responsibility in the provision of publicgoods. We emphasize that a typical public good will require many different inputs whichraises the possibility of partnerships to exploit comparative advantages of different parties.But hold-up problems...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860718
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On Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect
Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis; Ghatak, Maitreesh; Lensink, Robert - India Development Foundation; London School of …; … - 2005
We show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in Ghatak (2000) violate an ex post incentive-compatibility constraint which says the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. We derive and characterize optimal separating joint liability contracts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008911469
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Wie viel Vertrag braucht die deutsche Milchwirtschaft? – ErsteÜberlegungen zur Ausgestaltung des Contract Designs nach derQuote aus Sicht der Molkereien
Steffen, Nina; Schlecht, Stephanie; Müller, Hans Christian - Universität <Göttingen> / Department für … - 2010
Die Abschaffung der Milchquote im Wirtschaftsjahr 2014/2015 wird immer wahrscheinlicher(EUROPÄISCHE KOMMISSION, 2009). In diesem Zusammenhang wird aktuelldie Notwendigkeit einer Überarbeitung der vorhandenen Vertragssysteme stärkerdiskutiert. Einzelne Molkereien haben in den Bereichen...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009129501
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Competition and the Cost of Debt
Valta, Philip - Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research North … - 2010
This paper empirically investigates how the intensity of product market competitionaffects the cost of debt. Using a large sample of loans to publicly traded US manufac-turing fi…rms, I provide evidence that an intensi…fication of product market competitionamong fi…rms signifi…cantly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009305077
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Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms
Huck, Steffen; Kübler, Dorothea; Weibull, Jörgen - Institut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2010
This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. Weintroduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents’desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team productionwe examine the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360571
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Reputation and Credit Market Formation:How Relational Incentives and LegalContract Enforcement Interact
Fehr, Ernst; Zehnder, Christian - Institut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2009
The evidence suggests that relational contracting and legal rules play an important role incredit markets but on the basis of the prevailing field data it is difficult to pin down their causalimpact. Here we show experimentally that relational incentives are a powerful causaldeterminant for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360624
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Optimal Debt Design and the Role of Bankruptcy
Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von; Bergloef, Erik; Roland, Gerard - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich>; … - 2003
debt capacity while increasing its incentives to default strategically. The optimal debt contract gives creditors claims … financing contract, to make claims consistent and to prevent a value reducing run for the assets of the firm. It is not optimal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858759