Bubbles in asset markets have been documented in numerous experimentalstudies. However, all experiments in which bubbles occurpay dividends after each trading day. In this paper we study whetherbubbles can occur in markets without dividends. We investigate therole of two features that are...

In this paper, I present a theory of dynamic economic growth, business cycles, and asset pricing that integrates (1) Marx's idea (and emphasized by Klein) of a two-class heterogeneity of the ownership structure of physical capital and human capital in a capitalist society, (2) Keynes' idea of...

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives.We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the trueperformance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament...

In many environments, tournaments can elicit more effort from workers, except perhapswhen workers can sabotage each other. Because it is hard to separate effort, ability andoutput in many real workplace settings, the empirical evidence on the incentive effect oftournaments is thin...

In public good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of its membersfind it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, their inherentasymmetric nature may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informalsanctioning harder to accomplish...

In a two-person finitely repeated public goods experiment, we use intentionsdata to interpret individual behavior. Based on a random-utilitymodel specification, we develop a relationship between a player's beliefsabout others' behavior and his contributions' plans, and use this relationshipto...

We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation andsubject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysiswe …nd that the different predictions of previous imitation models aredue to different informational assumptions, not to different behavioralrules. It is...

This paper examines the determinants of informal sanctions by a large number of experiments.

A population of players is considered in which each player may select his neighbors in order to play a 2 × 2 coordination game with each of them. We analyze how the payoffs in the underlying coordination game effect the resulting equilibrium neighborhood resp. network structure.

The ability to cooperate in collective action problems — such as those relating to the useof common property resources or the provision of local public goods — is a key determinant ofeconomic performance. In this paper we discuss two aspects of collective action problemsin developing...