Bubbles in asset markets have been documented in numerous experimentalstudies. However, all experiments in which bubbles occurpay dividends after each trading day. In this paper we study whetherbubbles can occur in markets without dividends. We investigate therole of two features that are...

We develop a method that allows one to compute incomplete-market equilibria routinely forMarkovian equilibria (when they exist). The main difficulty to be overcome arises from the setof state variables. There are, of course, exogenous state variables driving the economy but, in anincomplete...

We prove that, in a heterogeneous economy with scale invariantutilities, the yield of a long term bond is determined by the agent with maximalexpected marginal utility.We also prove that the same result holds for the longterm forward rates.Furthermore, we apply Cramer’s large deviations...

We establish universal bounds for asset prices in heterogeneouscomplete market economies with scale invariant preferences. Namely, for eachagent in the economy we consider an artificial homogeneous economy, popu-lated solely by this agent and calculate the ”homogeneous” price of an asset...

In this paper, I present a theory of dynamic economic growth, business cycles, and asset pricing that integrates (1) Marx's idea (and emphasized by Klein) of a two-class heterogeneity of the ownership structure of physical capital and human capital in a capitalist society, (2) Keynes' idea of...

The ability to cooperate in collective action problems — such as those relating to the useof common property resources or the provision of local public goods — is a key determinant ofeconomic performance. In this paper we discuss two aspects of collective action problemsin developing...

This article examines the nature of human behavior in a nested socialdilemma referred to as the Spillover Game. Players are divided into twogroups with positive production interdependencies. Based on theoreticallyderived opportunistic, local, and global optima, our experimental...

In this paper, we study a voluntary contribution mechanism withone-way communication. The relevance of one person’s words is assessedby assigning exogeniously the role of the ‘communicator’ to onegroup member. Contrary to the view that the mutual exchange ofpromises is necessary for the...

We construct a simple three person trust game with one trustor and two trustees. The trustorhas the possibility to either trust both trustees or none, while the trustees make their decisionseither sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the treatment. When trustees play...

E-nstructions facilitates the use of electronic instructions in computerized laboratory ex-periments in social sciences. In this article I provide a set of guidelines for the installationand the use of E-nstructions.