This policy brief summarizes the scientific discussion about land deals and presents some initial empirical results from a field trip to a large land investment in Zambia. It is intended to serve as a background paper for the symposium session "Dealing with the Race for Agricultural Land" at the...

Large-scale land acquisitions, or "land grabs", concentrate in developing countries which are also known for their corruption-friendly setting caused by a weak institutional framework. We argue that corrupt elites exploit this given institutional set-up to strike deals with international...

Regulation often evolves, and affected consumers or firms may adjust their behavior in anticipation of potential changes to regulation. Using shifting land use regulation boundaries and oil lease prices from Canada, we estimate the effect of anticipated regulatory change on the value of land. We...

Large-scale land acquisitions often take place in developing countries which are also known for their corruption-friendliness caused by weak institutional frameworks. We hypothesize that corruption indeed leads to more land deals. We argue that corrupt elites exploit poor institutional setups...

Poorly developed countries with weak institutions often face severe commitment problems. International investors are reluctant to invest in these countries because their property rights are insufficiently protected. We argue that in order to overcome the commitment problem countries may subject...

This paper studies the determinants of foreign land acquisition for large-scale agriculture. To do so, gravity models are estimated using data on bilateral investment relationships, together with newly constructed indicators of agro-ecological suitability in areas with low population density as...