We consider a network economy in which economic agents are connected within a structure of value-generating relationships. Agents are assumed to be able to participate in three types of economic activities: autarkic self-provision; binary matching interactions; and multi-person cooperative...

In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decision makers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while...

We investigate Gately’s solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Gately’s conception is a bargaining solution and minimises the maximal quantified 'propensity to disrupt' the negotiation of the players over the allocation of the generated collective payoffs....

We introduce a new network centrality measure founded on the Gately value for cooperative games with transferable utilities. A directed network is interpreted as representing control or authority relations between players-constituting a hierarchical network. The power distribution embedded...

In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decisionmakers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while...

We consider a relational economy in which economic agents participate in three types of relational economic activities: autarkic activities; binary matching activities; and plural cooperative activities. We introduce a stability notion and characterize stable interaction structures, both in the...

We explore a broad class of values for cooperative games in characteristic function form, known as compromise values. These values efficiently allocate payoffs by linearly combining wellspecified upper and lower bounds on payoffs. We identify subclasses of games that admit nontrivial efficient...

In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shapley value does not assign anything to the non-productive players and the Equal Division rule does not concern itself...