It is common to think that replacing a judge with a new appointment nearer an ideological extreme will pull outcomes on the court in the ideological direction of the new appointment. This paper argues that this intuition is not always correct, at least for a class of close cases. The model...

An increasing share of world FDI is carried out by multinationals from developing countries. These investors may have objectives and constraints that differ from their developed country counterparts. In this paper we focus on differences in attitudes to corruption, and how these may shape the...

The principal aim of this paper is to select a contractor who offers the best value for money which will nearly always involve a process of competitive tendering. The final decision as to which contractor offers the best value for money will be determined by the factors like quality/price...

Regulatory reforms across European countries have attempted to increase consumer welfare by introducing competition and choice into public service markets. But it has been questioned whether reforms have benefited all people equally, suggesting that vulnerable groups of service users are...

We test the effectiveness of an anti-corruption policy that is often discussed among practitioners: an increase in competition among officials providing the same good or service. In particular, we investigate whether an increase in overlapping jurisdictions reduces extortionary corruption, i.e.,...

We assembled a large panel of project-level technical and financial data, as well as country-level economic, institutional, and political variables to assess how political competition and policy insulation feasibility determine private participation in financing infrastructure in emerging...

We experimentally investigate how the introduction of competition between public officials for the provision of a given license affects extortionary corruption, i.e., the demands of harassment bribes. We examine transactions that are likely to be one-shot, such as the delivery of a driver's...

We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituency sets required levels for a given set of activities. Activities are carried out by external providers who are supervised by bureaucrats. Bureaucrats can allow providers to deliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange...

We investigate a competitive labor market with team production. Workers differ in their motivation to exert team effort and types are private information. We show that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms and firms employing cooperative...