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Screening, competition, and job design : economic origins of good jobs
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2009
In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935665
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Screening, competition, and job design : economic origins of good jobs
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2010
In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003951888
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
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Constrained discretion and central bank transparency
Bianchi, Francesco; Melosi, Leonardo - 2016
We develop and estimate a general equilibrium model to quantitatively assess the effects and welfare implications of central bank transparency. Monetary policy can deviate from active inflation stabilization and agents conduct Bayesian learning about the nature of these deviations. Under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011560575
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Image versus information : changing societal norms and optimal privacy
Ali, S. Nageeb; Bénabou, Roland - 2016
reputation-conscious agents to supply a public good. Each agent chooses how much to contribute based on his own mix of public …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011476544
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When Galatea cares about her reputation : how having faith in your workers reduces their motivation to shine
Kamphorst, Jurjen J. A.; Swank, Otto H. - 2010
motivate employeeswho are driven by concerns about their reputation for being able. When employeesare driven by monetary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382589
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Credibility dynamics and disinflation plans
Kostadinov, Rumen; Roldán, Francisco - 2020
Central banker faces a tradeoff between surprise inflation and building reputation, defined as the private sector's belief … future grounds with temptation leads the way for a negative drift of reputation in equilibrium. Plans that successfully … the zero reputation limit, a gradual disinflation is preferred despite the absence of inflation inertia in the private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012251953
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Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown
Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 865-914
We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674079
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Career prospects and effort incentives : evidence from professional soccer
Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - 2014
It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011808006
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018
make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706