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Regulation of Europe's network industries : the perspective of the new economic theory of federalism
Bickenbach, Frank - 2000
The paper starts with a description of major reforms of EU policy in the network industries. Based on the normative economics of regulation, it then points out generic information and transaction cost problems of regulatory policy making. An appropriate allocation of regulatory competencies may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491086
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Optimal Democratic Mechanisms for Taxation and Public Good Provision
Bierbrauer, Felix J. - 2008
preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is … system. We then study democratic mechanisms with the property that tax payers vote over public goods. Under such a mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724347
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Dynamic Regulation of Public Good Quality
Auray, Stéphane - 2006
We investigate the design of incentives for public good quality provision in a dynamic regulation setting in which maintenance efforts and quality shocks have durable effects. When the regulator contracts with a sequence of agents, asymmetries of information can lead to over-provision of quality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012733978
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Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider
Celik, Gorkem; Shin, Dongsoo; Strausz, Roland - 2020
We study contracting between a public good provider and users with private valuations of the good. We show that, once the provider extracts the users' private information, she benefits from manipulating the collective information received from all users when communicating with them. We derive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012255849
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Regulation of non-marketed outputs and substitutable inputs
Bertsch, Joachim; Hagspiel, Simeon - 2015
costs. For this novel setting, we investigate the theoretically optimal Bayesian regulation mechanism. We find that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011442703
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Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance
Morath, Florian - 2011
Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011776
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Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance
Morath, Florian - 2010
Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009409122
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Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods Provision in a Large Economy with Aggregate Uncertainty
Bierbrauer, Felix J. - 2009
priori unknown. The analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that imposes a requirement of robustness with respect to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158141
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On the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods with Private Information : The Case of 'Weakest-Link' Public Goods
Barbieri, Stefano - 2014
We examine the private provision of a public good whose level is determined by the least contribution of individual group members. Nash equilibrium can be efficient when the game is one of full information. This paper introduces private information about the costs of effort and characterizes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055272
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Public-good provision with macro uncertainty about preferences : efficiency, budget balance, and robustness
Hellwig, Martin - 2021
mechanism of d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet is shown to implement an effi cient provision rule with budget balance. However, first … mechanism is independent of the stochastic specification within the class of specifications defined by the structure of the …-Groves mechanism converges to zero in probability when the number of participants becomes large. In the limit, with a continuum of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012657865