On 4 March 2011, SUERF – The European Money and Finance Forum and the National Bank of Poland jointly organised a conference on the theme of: "Monetary Policy after the Crisis". Following a call for papers with a large number of submissions, the scientific committee selected 9 papers, which...

On 5-6 September 2012 SUERF held its 30th Colloquium "States, Banks, and the Financing of the Economy" at the University of Zürich, Switzerland. The papers included in this SUERF Study are based on contributions to the Colloquium. All the chapters in this publication discuss from different...

On June 4-5, 2014, SUERF and Baffi Finlawmetrics jointly organised a Colloquium/Conference "Money, Regulation and Growth: Financing New Growth in Europe" at Bocconi University, Milan. The present SUERF Study includes a selection of papers based on the authors’ contributions to the Milan event....

The paper analyses the empirical relationship between bank risk and sovereign credit risk in the euro area. Using structural VAR with daily financial markets data for 2003-13, the analysis confirms two-way causality between shocks to sovereign risk and bank risk, with the former being overall...

In this paper we analyze a hybrid small-scale New-Keynesian model with an arbitrary frequency of the agents synchronized decision making. We study the impact of various demand and supply shocks on the dynamics of the model variables. We show that the corresponding impulse-response functions of...

We use a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study the impacts of an exogenous fall in aggregate demand, the resulting increase in public debt, and the consequences of a sovereign debt haircut for a member country or bloc of the union. In this union, the governments of...

We use a microfounded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with banks to study interactions between monetary and macroprudential policies in a small open economy. The model is calibrated/estimated for Korea. Cooperation of monetary and macroprudential policies is optimal under a...

Two signaling games of monetary policy are considered: game one examines the effect of hysteresis on the labor market on the results of the repeated monetary policy game. Disciplinary effects of reputation disappear in presence of hysteresis. The second game compares weifare effects of monetary...

On 11 March 2015, SUERF jointly organised a conference with the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the Austrian Society for Bank Research (Bankwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft - BWG). The present SUERF Study 2015/2 includes a selection of papers based on the authors' contributions to the Vienna...