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Pairing games and markets
Alkan, Ahmet; Tuncay, Alparslan - 2014
Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435
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Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R. - In: Games 7 (2016) 2, pp. 1-16
We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through … are currently employed/unemployed. We show that such a process is absorbed into the core with probability one in finite … time. Moreover, within the core, allocations are selected that are characterized by surplus splitting according to a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453256
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On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
Atay, Ata; Solymosi, Tamás - 2018
We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers (customers) and …-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011071
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Equilibrium and Matching Under Price Controls
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2015
The paper considers a one-to-one matching with contracts model in the presence of price controls. This set-up contains … two important streams in the matching literature, those with and those without monetary transfers, as special cases and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013029128
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Equilibrium and Matching Under Price Controls
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2015
The paper considers a one-to-one matching with contracts model in the presence of price controls. This set-up contains … two important streams in the matching literature, those with and those without monetary transfers, as special cases and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021278
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Externalities and Renegotiations in Three-Player Coalitional Bargaining
Gomes, Armando R. - 2004
This paper proposes a new solution concept to three-player coalitional bargaining problems. The coalitional bargaining problem is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in which players make conditional or unconditional offers, coalitions continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035050
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Inner core, asymmetric nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs
Brangewitz, Sonja; Gamp, Jan-Philip - 2011
We investigate the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for n-person bargaining … positive vectors of weights coincides with the inner core if all points in the underlying bargaining set are strictly positive … results on non-cooperative foundations of cooperative games. -- Inner Core ; Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution ; Competitive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009268595
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Endogenously proportional bargaining solutions
Sağlam, İsmail - 2012
This paper introduces a class of endogenously proportional bargaining solutions. These solutions are independent of the class of Directional solutions, which Chun and Thomson (1990a) proposed to generalize (exogenously) proportional solutions of Kalai (1977). Endogenously proportional solutions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009656696
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On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
Haake, Claus-Jochen (contributor);  … - 2007
Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731672
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Learning from a piece of pie : the empirical content of Nash bargaining
Chiappori, Pierre-André (contributor);  … - 2006
Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set of parameters [lamda] that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003388467