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Regulation of Europe's network industries : the perspective of the new economic theory of federalism
Bickenbach, Frank - 2000
The paper starts with a description of major reforms of EU policy in the network industries. Based on the normative economics of regulation, it then points out generic information and transaction cost problems of regulatory policy making. An appropriate allocation of regulatory competencies may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491086
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Regulation of Europe's network industries: the perspective of the new economic theory of federalism
Bickenbach, Frank - 2000
The paper starts with a description of major reforms of EU policy in the network industries. Based on the normative economics of regulation, it then points out generic information and transaction cost problems of regulatory policy making. An appropriate allocation of regulatory competencies may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265451
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The new institutional economics of antitrust and regulation
Bickenbach, Frank; Kumkar, Lars; Soltwedel, Rüdiger - 1999
Hybrid governance structures between markets and hierarchies in many industries, e.g., in energy and telecommunications, challenge antitrust and regulation policy. The paper focuses on the theoretical and methodological basis provided by the New Institutional Economics (NIE) for analyzing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011490672
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Regulation of Europe's network industries : the perspective of the new economic theory of federalism
Bickenbach, Frank - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013261081
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Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods Provision in a Large Economy with Aggregate Uncertainty
Bierbrauer, Felix J. - 2009
priori unknown. The analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that imposes a requirement of robustness with respect to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158141
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Public-good provision with macro uncertainty about preferences : efficiency, budget balance, and robustness
Hellwig, Martin - 2021
mechanism of d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet is shown to implement an effi cient provision rule with budget balance. However, first … mechanism is independent of the stochastic specification within the class of specifications defined by the structure of the …-Groves mechanism converges to zero in probability when the number of participants becomes large. In the limit, with a continuum of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012657865
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Public-Good Provision with Macro Uncertainty about Preferences : Efficiency, Budget Balance, and Robustness
Hellwig, Martin F. - 2021
mechanism of d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet is shown to implement an efficient provision rule with budget balance. However, first … mechanism is independent of the stochastic specification within the class of specifications defined by the structure of the …-Groves mechanism converges to zero in probability when the number of participants becomes large. In the limit, with a continuum of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013322513
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Open Data and Open Government : Rethinking Telecommunications Policy and Regulation
Sutherland, Ewan - 2013
While attention has been given to the uses of big data by network operators and to the provision of open data by governments, there has been no systematic attempt to re-examine the regulatory systems for telecommunications. The power of public authorities to access the big data held by operators...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014152588
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Regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation
Strausz, Roland - 2009
The paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation. Regulatory risk is captured by uncertainty about the policy variables in the regulator's objective function: weights attached to profits and costs of public funds. Results are as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003796198
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Regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation
Strausz, Roland - 2009
The paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk. Regulatory risk is captured by uncertainty about the policy variables in the regulator's objective function: weights attached to profits and costs of public funds. Results are as follows: 1) The regulator's reaction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850166