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Screening, competition, and job design : economic origins of good jobs
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2009
In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935665
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Screening, competition, and job design : economic origins of good jobs
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2010
In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003951888
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Reputation or reciprocity? : an experimental investigation
Gächter, Simon; Falk, Armin - 2001
Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. However, many of these relationships are long-term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398911
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Reputation transmission without benefit to the reporter : a behavioral underpinning of markets in experimental focus
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis G. - 2015 - This version: September 8, 2015
Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism in economic and social interactions. But it is often unclear what …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333021
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Fairness and trust in structured populations
Tarnita, Corina E. - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 214-230
not affect the winning strategy. Further considering the effects of reputation and structure, I find that they act …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316592
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Play it again : partner choice, reputation building and learning in restarting, finitely-repeated dilemma games
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis G. - 2013
remains unclear. In each of six treatments that vary the cooperation premium and the informational basis for reputation … forces of (a) learning about the benefits of reputation, and (b) learning about backward unraveling. We find, inter alia …, that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in reputation grows across sets of finitely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010126752
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
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Revenue implications of strategic and external auction risk
Robbett, Andrea; Graham, Michael K.; Matthews, Peter Hans - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-18
Two experimental treatments are used to study the effects of auction risk across five mechanisms. The first canonical, baseline treatment features only strategic risk and replicates the standard results that overbidding relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium is prevalent in all common...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453209
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Reputation and foreclosure with vertical integration : experimental evidence
Möllers, Claudia - 2016
Building on the seminal paper of Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), I study the role of reputation building on … foreclosure in laboratory experiments. In one-shot interactions, upstream firms can choose to build a reputation by revealing … their price history to the current upstream competitor. In particular, integrated firms can establish a reputation to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011555141
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Constrained discretion and central bank transparency
Bianchi, Francesco; Melosi, Leonardo - 2016
We develop and estimate a general equilibrium model to quantitatively assess the effects and welfare implications of central bank transparency. Monetary policy can deviate from active inflation stabilization and agents conduct Bayesian learning about the nature of these deviations. Under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011560575